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BEST INTEREST DUTIES OF FINANCIAL ADVISERS ―  
MORE LAW, MORE CONFUSION 
DAVID G MILLHOUSE1 
ABSTRACT 
 
Best interest is a commonly used and misunderstood phrase interpreted differently in the 
law, media, legislature and throughout the investment chain, sometimes glibly.  For 
investors, best interest has been confused with oft-misguided concepts of undivided loyalty 
to their economic interests.  
These differing interpretations influence every financial advice relationship, including 
process. That process differs with varying statutory applications of best interest. For 
example, best interest in Australian investment decisions conflicts with modern portfolio 
theory. The law is complex, often uncertain, and lags comparative jurisdictions. The 
FASEA2 Code of Ethics creates new law that adds to that uncertainty. Financial advice is 
provided throughout the investment chain. Competency requires comprehension of the 
underlying best interest duties governing those financial assets. The courts will also need to 
have regard to these other contextual interpretations of best interest to resolve uncertainty. 
That includes the best interest heritage in equity. 
ORIGIN OF THE BEST INTEREST DUTY 
The heritage of the best interest duty lies in equity. This means a fiduciary duty to give 
undivided loyalty to the beneficiaries and ‘trustees must do the best they can for the 
beneficiaries and not merely avoid harming them’.3 Meaning: ‘a combination of the 
established duties’4 rather than ‘a distinct and separate duty … not an obligation to act in 
a way which the trustee honestly considered to be in their interests, but a positive 
obligation to act in what are, objectively, their interests’.5 The trustees’ duty of undivided 
loyalty is ‘the most fundamental duty of a trustee’.6 ‘The duty of loyalty is, then, the fruit 
of the courts’ efforts to regulate the behaviour of trustees when their duties as trustees 
                                                                 
1 Adjunct Honorary Senior Research Fellow, Faculty of Law, Bond University, Australia. 
2 Financial Adviser Standards and Ethics Authority. 
3 Cowan v Scargill [1985] Ch 270, 295 (Sir Robert Megarry V-C). 
4 John Lehane, ‘Delegation of Trustees’ Powers and Current Developments in Investment Funds 
Management’ (1995) 7 Bond Law Review 36, 38. 
5 Ibid 37. 
6 Mark L Ascher, Austin Wakeman Scott and William Franklin Fratcher, Scott and Ascher on Trusts (Wolters 
Kluwer Law & Business, 5th ed, 2007) 1077. 
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require them to act in ways that may or do conflict with their own personal interests’.7 
Hence, the best interests duty 
is an ‘umbrella’ duty which embraces a large number of individual, well recognised duties8 
which is in addition to other trustee duties and includes ‘pursuit of the best possible authorised 
end or outcome for the trust as a whole but also the observance of proper procedures and 
processes in decision making’.9  
So, whilst a trustee may not actually achieve the best possible outcome for the 
beneficiaries, the trustee must act objectively, not just honestly, in striving to achieve that 
result. 
[I]t is difficult to discern the outer boundaries of the best interests duty and ‘the statute alone 
does not make clear where the boundary lies’ and it is appropriate to consider the meaning of 
the term under general law.10  
Best interests in their statutory formulations11 are mostly not defined, using general law 
phraseology of variable interpretation. More recent extension of superannuation 
covenants to corporate trustee directors personally, will require them to pay homage to 
the boundaries of the general law. That is also the position under the FASEA Code of 
Ethics, being additional to and different from other statutory provisions in the Corporations 
Act. Industry consolidation and vertical integration in financial services further complicate 
these duties because of the context specific interpretations of best interest. In Australia, 
general law interpretations of ‘umbrella duty’ have given way to statutory best interest 
duties which have little legal form, ‘ “benefit” … “interests” or “best interests”’ being used 
interchangeably.12 
‘[T]he case law directly interpreting and applying the relevant provisions is scant’.13 Some 
guidance in a statutory superannuation context of best interest and conflicts of interest are 
provided in Kelaher.14 ‘[T]he trustees best interests obligation … requires … that the trustee 
seek to achieve the best outcome … judged in relation to the risks of a particular 
                                                                 
7  Ibid 1079. 
8 ASIC v Australian Property Custodian Holdings Limited (Receivers and Managers appointed) (in liquidation) 
(Controllers appointed) (No 3) [2013] FCA 1342 (12 December 2013) [475] (Murphy J). 
9 Ibid [475] (Murphy J). 
10 Ibid [463] (Murphy J). 
11 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 601FC(1)(c), 601FD(1)b), 961B(1), 961B(2), 181, 180(2)(d), 766E, 964, ch 
8B, 921U(2)(b) ; Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) ss 52(2), 52(8), 10, 29 VN(a)–
(b); Fair Work Act s 382 (amended 2016). The best interest duty of mortgage brokers is yet to be 
enacted. 
12 David Pollard, ‘The Short-form “Best Interests Duty” ― Mad, Bad and Dangerous to Know: Part 1 ― 
Background, Cowan v Scargill and MNRPF’ (2018) 32(2) Trust Law International 106, 136, 147 quoting 
Lord Nicholls, “Trustees and their broader community: Where duty, morality and ethics converge’ 
(1995) 9 Trust Law International 7 cited in M Scott Donald, Submission to Royal Commission into 
Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services Industry (21 September 2018) [3]. 
13 Pamela F Hanrahan, ‘The relationship between equitable and statutory “best interests” obligations in 
financial services law’ (2013) 46(1) Journal of Equity 7 [V]. 
14 Australian Prudential Regulation Authority v Kelaher [2019] FCA 1521 (Jagot J). 
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action…’15 Best interest decisions should be objective with the decision maker (the trustee) 
having properly informed itself at the time of the decision. ‘The test is objective … to be 
applied prospectively … without permissible hindsight’.16 Best interest is concerned with 
action, not process.17 The conflicts of interest covenant is different and more onerous,18 
with subjective and objective elements, whilst recognising that conflicts of interest are 
‘inevitable’ and must be managed.19 Conflicts of interest must ‘have actually arisen rather 
than [being] mere possible future conflicts’.20 In this context, ‘conflicts which need to be 
managed are actual conflicts which have the capacity to significantly impact on the duty 
to act in the best interest of the beneficiaries’.21 A financial adviser meeting these tests 
would not be compliant with the FASEA Code of Ethics despite that advice being in a 
superannuation context. 
Whether the superlative ‘best’ has legal meaning at all,22 or whether it raises community 
expectations which are different from their legal basis further confuses present Australian 
law. It is not a formulation that can be taken literally and some opine that ‘best’ should 
not appear in the law at all.23 Its statutory use in short form ‘does not exist [at law] … is 
not a free-standing duty … does not override the terms of the trust … and does not 
replace the proper purposes requirement’.24 A literal interpretation is necessarily 
subjective, can be retrospective, and sets ‘an impossible standard. . .’25 In Australia, a literal 
interpretation of best interest may mean that trustees should not charge fees or seek 
indemnity.26 Until tested, this remains a risk for financial advisers. 
Indeed, ‘a literal best interest duty would be impossible to comply with fully ― there could 
always be more that the trustee board could do’.27 There is a distinction between ‘best 
interest’ and ‘best outcome’, this latter being akin to notions of community expectations. 
The benefits of hindsight may be an expectation, but it is not the law: it requires carrying 
out the terms of the trust which, assuming overlying statutory compliance,28 constitutes 
best interest not only of the trust but also of the beneficiaries of the trust. 
                                                                 
15 Ibid [49], [64] (Jagot J). 
16 Ibid [55] (Jagot J). 
17 Ibid [62] (Jagot J). 
18 Ibid [78] (Jagot J). 
19 Ibid [78]–[79] (Jagot J). 
20 Ibid [71] (Jagot J). 
21 Ibid [79] (Jagot J). 
22 Pollard, (n 12) 106. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Pollard, (n 12), 106, 108–9. 
25 Pollard, (n 12), 106, 109. 
26 Joe Campbell, ‘Some Aspects of the Civil Liability Arising from Breach of Duty by a Superannuation 
Trustee’ (2017) Legal Studies Research Paper 17/31, Sydney Law School, University of Sydney. 
27 Pollard, (n 12), 106, 189 citing Lionel Smith, ‘Fiduciary relationships: ensuring the loyal exercise of a 
judgement on behalf of another’ (2014) 130 Law Quarterly Review 608. 
28 Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 Cth ss 52(2)(c), 55(3), 56(2A), 29VO, 29VN, 29 VP 
Editorial Commentary (Non peer reviewed) 
(2020) Enterprise Governance eJournal: Centre for Commercial Law, Bond University 4 
Notions of ‘broader community’ where ‘duty, morality and ethics converge’29 pre-date 
Hayne’s confluence of ‘law and morality’. Whether these constitute best interest in 
Australian law are contextual with Parliament having scattered ‘statutory “best interest” 
duties with abandon’.30 
IS BEST INTEREST A FIDUCIARY DUTY? 
Australian law has uncertain interpretation of the fiduciary status of best interest duties.31 
‘Best interest’ needs to be applied carefully: the essential insight is that best interest is not 
the same as fiduciary duty, although its application is normally the responsibility of 
fiduciaries.  
Fiduciaries may be status based (directors, trustees, agents) or contractors (financial 
planners in general law). Status based fiduciaries are subjected to positive statutory 
extensions of their duty conferring nexus between fiduciary and beneficiary (in APRA 
regulated superannuation) and member (in MIS). These statutory best interest provisions 
accorded fiduciaries are positive, prescriptive and sometimes discretionary. They operate 
concurrently with proscriptive no-conflict, no-profit without informed consent rules 
under statute and general law and with non-fiduciary duties including duty of care. 
Nonetheless, the statutory duties are essentially ‘fiduciary’.32 
Unlike Wingecarribee and Bathurst  where financial advice fiduciary relationships existed,33 
Citigroup34 demonstrated it is possible in Australia to contract out of fiduciary 
responsibility: it can be extinguished ― the law does not prevent an investment bank from 
contracting out of a fiduciary capacity; whether it should be able to do so is a matter for 
the legislature, not the courts.35 
The critical matter in the end is the role that the alleged fiduciary has, or should be taken to 
have, in the relationship. It must so implicate that party in the other’s affairs or so align him 
with the protection or advancement of that other’s interest that foundation exists for the 
‘fiduciary expectation’.36 
‘Should be taken to have’ is the key to the mismatch between community expectation and 
practice. ‘[a] financial services licensee could make profits from information it received in 
                                                                 
29 Lord Nicholls, “Trustees and their broader community: Where duty, morality and ethics converge’ 
(1995) 9 Trust Law International 71. 
30 Pollard, (n 12), 106, 177. 
31 David G Millhouse, Evolution and Meaning of Fiduciary Duty ― Inconsistency and uncertainty in 
fiduciary law for Australian directors’ in Corporate Governance in Non-Bank Financial Entities (Lexis Nexis 
Butterworths, 2019) 209 [5.1]–[5.20]. 
32 Alpha Wealth Financial Services Pty Ltd v Frankland River Olive Company Ltd [2005] WASC 189 [33] (‘Alpha 
Wealth’). 
33 David G Millhouse, ‘Empirical Analysis supports the Hayne long run reform thesis’ (2019) 13(2-3) Law 
and Financial Markets Review 162. See generally David G Millhouse, Corporate Governance in Non-Bank 
Financial Entities (Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 2019). 
34 ASIC v Citigroup Global Markets Limited (ACN 113 114832)(No 4) [2007] FCA 963 (Jacobsen J). 
35 Ibid [7] (Jacobsen J). 
36 Ibid [274] (Jacobsen J) citing P D Finn, ‘The Fiduciary Principle’ in T G Youdan (ed), Equity, Fiduciaries 
and Trusts (Carswell, 1989) 1, 27. 
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the course of advising clients, or act in a way that was in conflict with the interests of a 
client, if it drafted its documentation so that it never had a fiduciary obligation to a client’.37 
This is the underlying tragedy of the FoFA reforms of 2012 which the Code of Ethics 
seeks to rectify. 
BEST INTEREST IN INVESTMENT STRATEGY 
Best interest duties are severely compromised by lack of development of the law of what 
constitutes investment strategy, its deficient relationship with modern portfolio theory and 
practice, and the interface with investment jurisdictions that have developed the law. This 
affects decisions on inward outward/capital flows. It creates jurisdictional risk. There is a 
similar lack of definition of what constitutes a defence in due diligence. 
As Donald notes, performance and appropriateness are both important objective criteria 
where there is no statutory definition of ‘investment strategy’.38 ‘Courts are unlikely to be 
sympathetic towards trustees [or financial planners] whose lack of diligence or care 
exposes their trust to uncompensated risks’.39 Risk is the corollary of return: prudence is 
not the absence of risk. These risks include valuation information from investment 
vehicles devoid of transparency (e.g. hedge and private equity funds, funds of funds). 
‘Direct investment by trustees into such [alternative] investments raises the “due diligence” 
bar very high indeed’40 with a ‘dramatic increase in the work required prior to and after 
investment to satisfy (and be seen to satisfy) the trustees’ duty of care’41 Trustees of 
Australian superannuation entities must follow the prudent superannuation trustee 
standard in each discrete investment decision. That it may not result in optimal investment 
portfolio performance for the fund by the standards of modern portfolio theory is not 
relevant to the decision, resulting in further uncertainty.42 This is not the case in US, 
Canada, and UK jurisdictions. Their law has evolved so that ‘prospective investments 
should be considered not in isolation from other investments, but rather in the context of 
the overall risk level of the fiduciary’s investment portfolio.’43 
In the absence of a statutory definition of investment strategy,44 ‘those responsible for the 
management of investment portfolios, such as trustees and their agents, are acutely 
worried that their actions will be judged with the benefit of hindsight or without regard 
                                                                 
37 J C Campbell March 2014 ‘Fiduciary Relationships in a Commercial Context’ Legal Studies Research 
Paper No 14/26, Sydney Law School 54 http://ssrn.com/abstract=2404202. 
38 M Scott Donald, ‘Prudence under pressure’ (2010) 4 Journal of Equity 44, 52. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid 53. 
41 Ibid 52. See also Nuncio D’Angelo, ‘Private equity investing by financial institutions: Navigating hidden 
reefs in treacherous waters’ (2003) 31 Australian Business Law Review 311. 
42 Paul U Ali and Martin Gold, ‘An overview of “Portable Alpha” Strategies, with Practical Guidance for 
Fiduciaries and some Comments on the Prudent Investor Rule’ (2001) 19 Company and Securities Law 
Journal 276. 
43 Paul U Ali, ‘Adding Yield to Stable Portfolios: Regulating Investments in Australian Hedge Funds’ 
(2001) 19 Company and Securities Law Journal 426.  
44 Donald, (n 38). 
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for the portfolio context’.45 ‘Due diligence’ is subjective and can ‘connote different things 
to different people’.46  
Best interests of the trust are not necessarily the same as best interests of specific 
beneficiaries and the best interest duty allows trustees to not perform an action.47 Best 
interest relies upon the purposes of the trust and what benefits were intended to be 
conferred on the trusts’ beneficiaries.48 It may mean ‘best financial interest’,49 in which 
case choice of investment options (rather than default options) in superannuation 
products may expose trustee directors to claims arising from poor investment choices by 
the beneficiary50 or their financial advisers. Best financial interest may mean long term 
financial interest requiring trustee responsibility for asset liquidity, beneficiary longevity, 
and other market-linked risks. 
For MySuper products, there are additional requirements. These include a prescriptive 
duty to ‘promote the financial interests of the beneficiaries’,51 and ‘determine on an annual 
basis whether the beneficiaries are disadvantaged in comparison to beneficiaries of other 
funds holding a My Super product.52  
‘The relationship between statutory provisions and the general law … is much more 
problematic ... likely to tax the cognitive powers of its subjects just as surely as they impose 
a cost burden on them’.53 What ‘the interests’ of aggrieved persons may be and how they 
ought to be protected are matters incapable of categorisation or of precise definition.54 
BEST INTEREST IN FINANCIAL ADVICE 
Reasonable expectations of financial advice and its implementation may give rise to an 
equitable fiduciary relationship in personalised financial advice,55 but is facts specific.56 
‘The precise content of that obligation is in every case, including that of each financial 
services firm, particular to the nature of the undertaking from which the fiduciary 
                                                                 
45 Ibid 51.  
46 Ibid 52.  
47 Ibid; See Rouse v IOOF Australia Trustees Ltd (1999) 73 SASR 484, 499–500. 
48 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 181(1), 601FC(1)(c), 601FD(1)(c); Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 
1993 (Cth) s 52(2)(c). 
49 M S Donald, ‘“Best” interests?’ (2008) 2 Journal of Equity 245, 256. 
50 Ibid 271. 
51 Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) s 29VN. 
52 M S Donald, ‘Regulating for fiduciary qualities of conduct’ (2013) 7(2) Journal of Equity 142, 150. 
53 Ibid 159. 
54 Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Bridgecorp Finance Ltd [2006] NSWSC 836 [17] (Barrett J) 
citing Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Mauer-Swiss Securities Ltd [2002] NSWSC 684 
(Palmer J). 
55 Pamela F Hanrahan, ‘The relationship between equitable and statutory “best interests” obligations in 
financial services law’ (2013) 7(1) Journal of Equity 46 [11]. 
56 Ibid [111] citing Maguire v Makaronis   188 CLR 449, 467 (Brennan CJ, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow 
JJ). 
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obligation springs’.57 It may spring from the initial contact with a putative client ‘advice 
about advice’, 58 before providing the statutorily controlled ‘substantive advice’. 59   
Much rests upon the Wallis inspired principles of disclosure and client ability to properly 
provide informed consent, both of which are subjective tests. 
Mere disclosure of this information may not be enough to establish the level of fully informed 
consent that equity requires. The client must understand the impact of what is being disclosed 
in its position and its relationship with the financial services firm, and must give its consent 
(express or implied) to the existence of that conflict or collateral advantage … the firm has the 
onus of proving that it obtained the client’s fully informed consent to its obtaining any benefit, 
or acting when it had a conflict in, that relationship. The burden in equity is high, particularly 
where the client is unsophisticated.60 
This echoes but is a different and lesser obligation than the German civil law doctrine of 
culpa in contrahendo being positive ex ante action requiring client comprehension which 
cannot be contracted away. Australian informed consent law is not a positive fiduciary 
duty ― ‘the existence of an informed consent goes to negate what otherwise would be a 
breach of [fiduciary] duty.’61 The fiduciary must be in receipt of or obtain informed 
consent, but the obtaining of it is not a fiduciary duty. That process will depend on context, 
often in contract.62 
There has been a common expectation by financial products investors seeking financial 
advice that there is a relationship based in fiduciary principles. Part of the mismatch in 
expectations has been poor financial literacy and misunderstanding of the law, but part is 
innate trust assumed by investors in professional persons with whom they deal.  
Where a bank gives a customer advice upon financial affairs, then in addition to any contractual 
rights the customer may have, the relationship between the parties may be such as to found 
either, or both, a common law duty of care and a fiduciary duty.63  
‘A person offering personal advice to a retail client ‘must act in the best interests of the 
client in relation to the advice’64 The  
duty is to furnish the client with all the relevant knowledge which the adviser possesses, 
concealing nothing that might reasonably be regarded as relevant to the making of the 
                                                                 
57 Hanrahan, (n 55), [V1].  
58 Simone Degeling and Jessica Hudson, ‘Fiduciary obligations, financial advisers and FOFA’ (2014) 32 
Companies and Securities Law Journal 527; Simone Degeling and Jessica Hudson, ‘Equitable money 
remedies against advisers who give “advice about advice”’ (2015) 33 Companies and Securities Law Journal 
166. 
59 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 961B(2). 
60 Degeling, (n 58), 527 [111]. 
61 Maguire v Makaronis 188 CLR 449, 467 (Brennan CJ, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ). 
62 See, eg, ASIC v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Ltd (No 4) [2007] FCA 963; ABN Amro Bank NV v 
Bathurst Regional Council [2014] FCAFC 65; Wingecarribee Shire Council v Lehman Brothers Australia Ltd (in 
Liq) [2012] FCA 1028. 
63 Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Smith [1991] FCA 375. 
64 Hanrahan, (n 55), 71. 
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investment decision’ and ‘to give the best advice which the adviser could give if he did not have 
but a third party did have a financial interest in the investment to be offered, to reveal fully the 
adviser’s financial interest, and to obtain for the client the best terms which the client would 
obtain from a third party if the adviser were to exercise due diligence on behalf of his client in 
such a transaction.65  
This applies in other advisory relationships: 
Normally, the relationship between a stockbroker and his client will be one of a fiduciary nature 
and such as to place on the broker an obligation to make the client a full and accurate disclosure 
of the broker’s own interest in the transaction. … The duty arises when, and because, a 
relationship of confidence exists between the parties.66  
Variance from these duties requires the fiduciary to obtain fully informed consent from 
their client. ‘What is required for a fully informed consent is a question of fact in all of the 
circumstances of each case and there is no precise formula which will determine in all 
cases if fully informed consent has been given’.67 
‘The duties and obligations that Australian financial services firms owe to their clients 
derive from a complex set of rules and principles arising in common law (particularly 
contract and tort), equity (including fiduciary principles) and statute’.68 Whilst financial 
services businesses are not recognised as status-based fiduciaries, and financial planners 
have no statutory fiduciary duty, the obligations are specific to the context in which 
financial services are provided and the contracts under which they are provided. 
Where both the equitable and statutory obligations apply, the statutory duties do not displace 
the equitable principles … [and] may well impose different (and more onerous) obligations on 
financial services firms than the statutory duties…69  
The statutory best interest duty in financial advice is prescriptive,70 including seven 
measures, and requires an appropriateness test for retail clients.71 These are ‘highly 
relevant to the Court’s assessment of compliance with the best interest duty’.72 They add 
to concepts of fiduciary duty in the same case, perhaps even subsuming them.73 ‘It is likely 
to be many years before the courts can interpret the content of the duty … will take many 
                                                                 
65 Wingecarribee Shire Council v Lehman Brothers Australia Ltd (in Liq) [2012] FCA 1028 [741] (Rares J). 
66 Ibid [739] (Rares J). 
67 Ibid [742] (Rares J). 
68 Hanrahan, (n 55), 72. 
69 Hanrahan, (n 55), 73. 
70 Corporations Amendment (Further Future of Financial Advice Measures) Act 2012 (Cth) s 961B; Corporations Act 
2011 (Cth) s 961B(1). 
71 Corporations Amendment (Further Future of Financial Advice Measures) Act 2012 (Cth) s 961G. 
72 ASIC, in the matter of NSG Services Pty Ltd [2017] FCA 345 [18] (Moshinsky J). 
73 Donald, (n 52), 142. 
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years and many cases before it is clear how the best interest duty operates74 … and greatly 
complicates the existing regime of protections’.75   
[T]he statutory best interest provision is a long way from what equity understands the ‘best 
interest’ concept to mean, on even the narrowest view of that understanding. … The statutory 
best interest obligation is expressed as a series of steps to be undertaken, not as an obligation 
to prefer the client’s interest over the firm’s or to avoid the situations of conflict or collateral 
damage that fiduciary law proscribes … [and is] a significant departure from the best interest 
obligations that apply in equity to financial advisers.76 
It is process driven, not outcome driven, provides a safe haven for advisers,77 does not 
fulfil its original policy objectives of statutory fiduciary duty and therefore does not meet 
community expectations of what the law should mean. These include fiduciary obligations 
of undivided loyalty of financial and corporate advisers to their clients, and restorative 
remedies for breach. It further entrenches the doctrine of prioritisation over prohibition. 
‘[I]t may operate to limit existing duties of financial advisers … apparently contrary to the 
intention of the post-GFC reforms’.78  
Subsequent testing in 2017 provides the proof: 100% of advisers in the sample relied on 
the statutory safe harbour provision. 75% of those advisers claiming reliance on it did not 
comply with their statutory best interest duty with 10% leaving their client in a worse 
financial position.79 This is damning evidence of the subsuming of general law fiduciary 
obligation by compromised statute. It arose from the politicisation of the debate: it was a 
sop, sought to be remedied by the FASEA Code of Ethics. 
Accretive statutory change has bizarre results: 
the new law applies to some financial services firms who are not fiduciaries with respect to the 
giving of that advice at general law. However, because of the narrow definition of retail client, 
many financial advisers who are fiduciaries (for example, the advisers in Wingecarribee and 
Bathurst80) are not subject to the new law.81 
‘We live in the ‘Age of Statutes’.82 Insightfully, the intrusion of statute ‘is all too evident 
in both the FoFA and Stronger Super reforms. It is manifest in the sheer number of 
provisions that have been required to achieve a small number of easily articulated 
                                                                 
74 S Corones and T Galloway, ‘The effectiveness of the best interest duty ― enhancing consumer 
protection?’ (2013) 41 Australian Business Law Review 5. 
75 Ibid 9. 
76 Hanrahan, (n 55), [V]. 
77 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 961B(2)(a)–(g). 
78 Hanrahan, (n 55), [V]. 
79 ASIC, Financial advice: Vertically integrated institutions and conflicts of interest (Report 562, January 2018) [151]–
[152]. 
80 ABN Amro Bank NV v Bathurst Regional Council [2014] FCAFC 65 (Jacobson, Gilmour and Gordon JJ). 
81 Hanrahan, (n 55), [V]. 
82 Dimity Kingsford Smith, ‘Is “due diligence” dead? Financial Services and products disclosure under the 
Corporations Act’ (2004) 22 Company and Securities Law Journal 130. 
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objectives’.83 ‘The provisions relating to the prohibition of certain types of “conflicted 
remuneration” are particularly Byzantine’.84 
BEST INTEREST IN FINANCIAL ADVICE IN THE UNITED STATES ―  
AUSTRALIAN ECHOES 
Best interest duties in the US, as in Australia are: 
highly ambiguous,85 leaving significant practical questions unanswered, and investment 
advisers and their clients left to ‘divine, if not guess, the application in everyday business life of 
basic fiduciary obligations, such as the duty to provide impartial advice’.86 
This ambiguity consumes hundreds [400] of pages describing the [proposed] new ‘best 
interest” standard’.87 Duties of financial advisers, however termed, in the US, are not 
necessarily fiduciary in nature and should only apply ‘where there is a broad delegation of 
power to manage another’s property...’88 Describing non-fiduciary duties as part of the 
attempted uniform fiduciary standard has only served ambiguity and those that prosper 
from it. In Canada, these operate concurrently within the Client Relationship Model which 
provides for the alignment of fiduciary duty with the client engagement contract. In the 
US, a client engagement contract is mandatory with an alignment of fiduciary duty with 
the scope of engagement.89 
Some opine that ‘standards should be based on analogous trust law concepts’,90 and trust 
law should ‘inform the best interest standard’,91 being in the entrustor’s sole interest.92 
Legal uncertainty is manifested, as in Australia, by the use of the adjective ‘fiduciary’ and 
the aphorism ‘best interest’, each applying in the different legal contexts of broker-dealers, 
investment advisers, including as they apply to DOL regulated pension funds. ‘A fiduciary 
under [ERISA] … means something other than a fiduciary under the Investment Advisers 
                                                                 
83 Donald, (n 52), 142 [3]. 
84 Ibid [1]. 
85 L Paglia, Standard of Conduct for Advisors and Dealers: Exploring the Appropriateness of Introducing a Statutory Best 
Interest Duty when Advice is provided to Retail Clients (Canadian Securities Administrators Consultation 
Paper 33―403, 2013) 19 citing A B Laby, ‘Current Issues in Fiduciary Law ― SEC v. Capital Gains 
Research Bureau and the Investment Advisors Act of 1940’ (2011) 91 Boston Law Review 1051. 
86 Ibid citing Barry BP Barbash and Jai Massari, ‘The Investment Advisers Act of 1940: Regulation by 
Accretion’ (2008) 39 Rutgers Law Journal 627, 654. 
87 Hester M Peirce, What’s In A Name: Regulation Best Interest v. Fiduciary–Remarks begore the NAPA 
DC Fly-in Forum (Washington DC, 24 July 2018) cited in Pamela Hanrahan, Information about 
Selected Aspects of Foreign Financial Services Regulation, Background Paper 30, Royal Commission 
into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services Industry [‘Hayne’] 41. 
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Act of 1940. Even within the same legal context, the term “fiduciary” can change over 
time’.93 
What is clear is that there is a difference between the meaning of fiduciary and the meaning 
of best interest. For broker-dealers, best interest is process driven, akin to s 961B(2) of the 
Corporations Act, a significant difference in the US being for the broker-dealer to eliminate 
rather than manage conflicts of interest with their clients, consistent with the FASEA 
Code of Ethics. For investment advisers, the fiduciary standard is principles-based but the 
proposed statutory best interest rules also apply. However, an investment adviser has an 
ongoing duty, whereas the broker-dealer has a transactional duty.  
As in Australia, where ‘best interest’ leaps from the lips of the less thoughtful, ‘[p]roposed 
Regulation Best Interest does not attempt to define best interest [other than the process 
of its application]  because nobody can explain what it means’.94 Including SEC 
Commissioners.95 
THE FINANCIAL STANDARDS AND ETHICS AUTHORITY CODE OF ETHICS BEST 
INTEREST OBLIGATIONS 
FASEA was established by amendments to the Corporations Act.96 FASEA is subject to 
Ministerial oversight and parliamentary reporting. It is new law and does not replace 
existing best interest provisions:97 It is not an overlay on, or consistent with those 
provisions. FASEA is statutorily mandated to create and enforce a Code of Ethics.98 Its 
best interest obligations compulsorily apply to ‘relevant providers’, being financial 
planners (now a restricted term) and their firms, and to ‘monitoring bodies’. ASIC must 
be notified in cases of relevant provider actual or possible non-compliance.99 A 
monitoring body must have ‘sufficient resources and expertise to appropriately monitor 
and enforce compliance with the Code of Ethics…’100 This means that the relevant 
provider and the monitoring body must be able to decipher the Code’s best interest duties. 
The determination by the monitoring body is not a legislative instrument, but the Code 
is.101  
The Code contains five values and twelve standards, imposed personally. The standards 
contain the best interest duties. These and the values are mostly subjective, but nonetheless 
have the force of law. Civil penalties apply. It applies to ‘relevant providers’102 not only to 
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94 Ibid. 
95 Brian Menickella, What Defines Best Interest? The SEC’s Entry into The Regulation Game, May 18, 
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traditionally termed financial advisers.103  It introduces further confusion into the 
retail/wholesale investor typology by extending the interpretation of retail investor, an 
area which already requires law reform.104 These values, noble as they are intended to be, 
the best interest duties, and the monitoring bodies’ enforcement power will need to be 
tested in the courts. Until then, ‘[e]ach [adviser] must be ready to give an account of how 
they have interpreted and applied the Code in specific situations’.105 
Best interest duties appear in Standards 2 (broader, long-term interests, likely future 
circumstances, 3 (indirectly, through conflict of interest), 5 (client comprehension, 
appropriateness), 6 (broader, long-term interests), 7 (indirectly, through value for money), 
and 9 (broad effects, broader long-term interest, likely circumstances, competence). The 
Code ‘must be read and applied as a whole’.106 Therefore, other provisions which 
themselves have been problematic in financial services law, become relevant to the 
interpretation of best interest duties. These other duties include truly informed consent 
and client comprehension. In addition, there is a public interest duty which will interface 
with evolving whistle-blower law. 
Doubtless, the Code and FASEA itself are well-intentioned responses to egregious 
behaviour identified by Hayne and others, quantified by this author.107 It seeks to convert 
an industry into a profession. However, the FASEA Code of Ethics is unlike Codes of 
various forms in other jurisdictions which operate on a comply-or-explain basis. 
The Law Matters thesis108 suggests jurisprudence underpins a competitive economy and 
the presumption that the law can facilitate economic development and not simply coerce, 
regulate and control.109 ‘Canadian corporate law follows the normative prescription that 
the law ought to provide the rules that parties want.’110 The German Corporate 
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Governance Code operates on a comply-or-explain basis, and with demonstrably 
improved empirical outcomes for investors.111  
What is missing for effective and equitable implementation is the jurisprudence required 
to give the FASEA Code support. In civil law jurisdictions this is provided by the untreue 
principle (now codified in European Union statutes) and supported by contractual culpa in 
contrahendo standards. Together, these make for a close-to-personal liability jurisdiction. 
Also missing is the necessary supervisory architecture. In Canada, this is provided by the 
Client Relationship Model (which includes all form of fiduciary and non-fiduciary duties 
which may constitute best interest) enforced through Self-Regulatory Organisations. This 
model includes client comprehension in ‘teachable moments’. Canadian financial advisers 
do not have the ‘safe-harbour defence.112 These are jurisdictions which FASEA would be 
wise to follow. 
CONCLUSION 
In Australia a financial adviser may comply with the existing best interest provisions of 
the Corporations Act, with trustee obligations as if they were a fiduciary, maintain their 
‘punctilio of honour’ and honesty, comply with their client contract, but nonetheless not 
be compliant with the FASEA Code of Ethics.  
Despite the publication of cameos describing various client circumstances,113 these are 
not cases, do not establish precedent, and are not law. That is the realm of the courts. 
There is no obligation for the publishers of these cameos to follow their own guidance in 
future litigation. Relevantly, as Donald insightfully noted in a FoFA best interest context,  
It is ironic, then that those same political processes that are privileging these nobler qualities 
[of fiduciaries] are in fact de-coupling the regulatory regimes from the general law antecedents 
in which those qualities were initially expressed. Political processes are ensuring that what the 
law expects of Mason J’s quintessential fiduciaries, or at least those whose activities encroach 
on areas of public policy, are regulated by multi-layered, highly specific, bespoke regulatory 
regimes that largely eclipse the proscriptions and prescriptions of the general law.114 
In the meantime, financial advisers have unlimited personal liability – in quantum and in 
tenor, outcomes being dependent on future judicial determinations. Caveat venditor.  
Future boards of FASEA will have no choice but to come to grips with the legal 
uncertainty its Code of Ethics has created. To quote David Pollard, ‘Short Form Best 
Interest ― Mad, Bad and Dangerous to know’.115 The reading list for the compulsory 
examination116 contains no direct authoritative references to the central questions of best 
interest and, because of the way the Code is drafted, other law (for instance, what 
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constitutes ‘informed consent’) which support the best interest duties. This raises doubts 
about the veracity of the examination for the adviser in their quest for legal certainty. 
Its objectives are doubtless pure, but its Code of Ethics does not have the jurisprudence 
and statutory support of pure liability civil law countries or the necessary supervisory 
architecture for effective implementation. These will take some years. In the meantime, 
the Code should operate on a comply-or-explain basis. Advisers, for their own defence, 
may themselves want to become status-based fiduciaries by virtue of contract and apply 
absolutist fiduciary principles.117 FASEA does not deploy ‘fiduciary’ either as noun or 
adjective, but that is the legal implication of its Code of Ethics. This new law is de-coupled 
from its general law antecedents.118 
The present danger is the Code be applied rigidly and onerously, becoming an end in itself, 
rather than a tool to benefit the financial consumer.119 It is a reform with significant legal 
ramifications. 
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